The Effect of Future Availability of Information on Willingness to Pay by Corrigan, Jay R.
CARD Working Papers CARD Reports and Working Papers
12-2001
The Effect of Future Availability of Information on
Willingness to Pay
Jay R. Corrigan
Iowa State University
Follow this and additional works at: http://lib.dr.iastate.edu/card_workingpapers
Part of the Agricultural and Resource Economics Commons, and the Behavioral Economics
Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the CARD Reports and Working Papers at Iowa State University Digital Repository. It has
been accepted for inclusion in CARD Working Papers by an authorized administrator of Iowa State University Digital Repository. For more
information, please contact digirep@iastate.edu.
Recommended Citation
Corrigan, Jay R., "The Effect of Future Availability of Information on Willingness to Pay" (2001). CARD Working Papers. 297.
http://lib.dr.iastate.edu/card_workingpapers/297
The Effect of Future Availability of Information on Willingness to Pay
Abstract
This paper analyzes the effect that potential future availability of information has on willingness to pay in a
contingent market characterized by uncertainty and irreversibility. In particular, I test whether the effect is
consistent with the predictions of Zhao and Kling's (forthcoming) theory of commitment cost. The analysis is
performed using the results of a contingent valuation study designed to estimate the degree to which local
residents value improved water quality in Clear Lake, a spring-fed, glacial lake located in north-central Iowa.
The results show that willingness to pay is highly sensitive to the potential for future learning. Offering survey
respondents the opportunity to delay their purchasing decision until more information is available led to a
significant decrease in willingness to pay. This suggests that contingent valuation practitioners must take care
to accurately represent the potential for future learning or else risk biased valuation estimates.
Keywords
commitment cost, contingent valuation, real options
Disciplines
Agricultural and Resource Economics | Behavioral Economics
This article is available at Iowa State University Digital Repository: http://lib.dr.iastate.edu/card_workingpapers/297
 
 
 
The Effect of Future Availability of Information 
on Willingness to Pay 
 
 
Jay Corrigan 
 
 
Working Paper 01-WP 290 
December 2001 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Center for Agricultural and Rural Development 
Iowa State University 
Ames, Iowa 50011-1070 
www.card.iastate.edu 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Jay Corrigan is a graduate assistant at the Center for Agricultural and Rural Development and a 
graduate student in the Department of Economics at Iowa State University. 
 
This publication is available online on the CARD website: www.card.iastate.edu. Permission is 
granted to reproduce this information with appropriate attribution to the author and the Center for 
Agricultural and Rural Development, Iowa State University, Ames, Iowa 50011-1070. 
 
For questions or comments about the contents of this paper, please contact Jay Corrigan, 62B 
Heady Hall, Iowa State University, Ames, IA 50011-1070; Ph: 515-294-6273; Fax: 515-294-6336; 
E-mail: jcorrig@iastate.edu. 
 
Iowa State University does not discriminate on the basis of race, color, age, religion, national origin, sexual 
orientation, sex, marital status, disability, or status as a U.S. Vietnam Era Veteran. Any persons having 
inquiries concerning this may contact the Director of Affirmative Action, 318 Beardshear Hall, 515-294-7612. 
 
 
 
Abstract 
This paper analyzes the effect that potential future availability of information has on 
willingness to pay in a contingent market characterized by uncertainty and irreversibility. 
In particular, I test whether the effect is consistent with the predictions of Zhao and 
Kling’s (forthcoming) theory of commitment cost. The analysis is performed using the 
results of a contingent valuation study designed to estimate the degree to which local 
residents value improved water quality in Clear Lake, a spring-fed, glacial lake located in 
north-central Iowa. The results show that willingness to pay is highly sensitive to the 
potential for future learning. Offering survey respondents the opportunity to delay their 
purchasing decision until more information is available led to a significant decrease in 
willingness to pay. This suggests that contingent valuation practitioners must take care to 
accurately represent the potential for future learning or else risk biased valuation 
estimates. 
 
Key words:  commitment cost, contingent valuation, real options.
  
 
 
 
THE EFFECT OF FUTURE AVAILABILITY OF INFORMATION  
ON WILLINGNESS TO PAY 
Environmental economists have long recognized the importance of providing 
respondents with adequate information when eliciting willingness to pay within the 
contingent valuation framework. For example, studies have shown that information about 
resource quality, the price and availability of substitutes, and the respondents’ budget 
constraints all significantly affect willingness to pay. Less attention has been given to the 
dynamic nature of the value formulation process and how it might be affected by 
uncertainty and the potential availability of future information. However, in a contingent 
market characterized by uncertainty and the potential for future learning, the ability to 
delay an irreversible decision may have a significant effect on respondents’ willingness to 
pay in the current period.  
Zhao and Kling (forthcoming) have developed a model focusing on what they call 
“commitment cost.” Their model uses real options theory to analyze the effect of 
potential future learning on willingness to pay (WTP) in the presence of uncertainty and 
irreversibility.  
My goal in this study is to test whether offering survey respondents the opportunity 
to delay the decision to “purchase” an environmental quality improvement affects 
willingness to pay and, in particular, whether the effects are consistent with the 
predictions of the commitment cost model. Data for this analysis were collected in the 
fall of 2000 using a survey designed to estimate the value area residents place on 
improved water quality in Clear Lake, a spring-fed, glacial lake located in north-central 
Iowa. In order to gauge the impact of potential learning on WTP, some respondents were 
told that the hypothetical referendum contained in the survey instrument represented their 
final chance to vote on improving water quality. Others were told that, should the 
referendum fail, they would be given a second chance to vote on the same initiative once 
further water quality research had been conducted. Respondents were also presented with 
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varying degrees of uncertainty regarding the extent of improvement that would follow 
from the proposed clean-up measures. The survey’s results suggest that, under certain 
circumstances, offering respondents the ability to delay their decision significantly 
reduces willingness to pay.  
 
Background 
To date, empirical work on the effect of information on WTP primarily has focused 
on a static value formulation problem. In their survey of the literature, Blomquist and 
Whitehead (1998) present the respondent’s maximization problem as  
1 2max  ( , , ) subject to 'U q q x p x m£ , 
where U(·) is the utility function, q1 is the environmental good of interest, q2 is a vector of 
substitute environmental goods, x represents all private goods, m is the respondent’s 
income, and p is a vector of prices. The authors point out that empirical work on the 
effects of information on valuation has focused on information regarding the quality of 
q1, the price and availability of q2, and information reminding respondents of their budget 
constraint. For example, Samples, Dixon, and Gowen (1986); Bergstrom, Stoll, and 
Randall (1990); and Blomquist and Whitehead (1998) show that information regarding 
resource quality significantly impacts valuation. With respect to the price and availability 
of substitutes, empirical work by Boyle, Reiling, and Phillips (1990) suggests that 
information regarding changes in the price of alternative outdoor activities has no effect 
on WTP for a related good. Similarly, Loomis, Gonzalez-Caban, and Gregory (1994) find 
that information regarding the price and availability of substitutes has no significant 
effect on WTP when respondents are familiar with the resource being valued. However, a 
more recent study by Whitehead and Blomquist (1997) finds that such information plays 
a significant role for respondents unfamiliar with the resource. And while Loomis, 
Gonzalez-Caban, and Gregory find that providing respondents with information 
regarding their budget constraint has no effect on WTP, Cummings and Taylor (1999) 
and List (forthcoming) show that such information can significantly reduce WTP. 
While the empirical literature has established the importance of information in the 
practice of contingent valuation, it largely has ignored the dynamic issues associated with 
the value formulation process. To date, work that considers these issues primarily has 
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been theoretical. For example, Hoehn and Randall (1987) propose what they call the 
value formulation problem. They model the formulation of stated benefit measures as 
subject to two types of error: that due to imperfect information and that due to time 
constraints. Imperfect communication arises when survey designers try to convey 
complex policy issues to respondents. Misunderstanding or miscommunication of these 
issues leads to greater uncertainty surrounding the value of the good in question. The 
result is a decrease in reported WTP. Likewise, placing constraints on the amount of time 
respondents have to consider valuation questions cuts short their utility maximization 
process and leads to a decrease in reported WTP.  
Also of interest is the quasi-option-value literature based on the work of Arrow and 
Fisher (1974) and Henry (1974). In contrast to Weisbrod’s (1964) original concept of 
option value, which today is viewed essentially as a risk premium, quasi option value 
(QOV) may be non-zero even when agents are risk neutral. QOV takes into account not 
only uncertainty but also the irreversibility of development and the resulting asymmetry 
of the development decision. This asymmetry follows from the fact that the decision to 
preserve a resource in the current period can be reversed if the decision is made to 
develop in the future. On the other hand, the decision to develop in the current period 
cannot be reversed in the future because the landscape has been irreparably altered. Faced 
with uncertainty and asymmetric irreversibility, there exists an incentive to delay 
development until more information becomes available. An agent who considers these 
issues will pursue less development in the current period than would a naive agent. QOV 
is equal to a shadow tax that induces the efficient level of development from the naive 
agent. As Hanemann (1989) puts it, QOV is the conditional value of perfect information, 
conditional, that is, on the resource being preserved today. Conrad (1980), Viscusi 
(1988), Hanemann (1989) and Usategui (1990), among others, have added to the 
theoretical work related to QOV.  
Little empirical work has been published on the magnitude of QOV relative to 
expected consumer surplus. An exception is work on mining development by Greenley, 
Walsh, and Young (1981), though their survey design and theoretical underpinnings have 
been criticized (see Brookshire, Eubanks, and Randall 1983; Freeman 1984; Mitchell and 
Carson 1985; and Hanemann 1989).  
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Zhao and Kling look at the formulation of WTP in a dynamic setting characterized 
by uncertainty, irreversibility, and the potential for future learning. Given that an agent is 
uncertain about the actual value of the good she is interested in buying, delaying the 
transaction may be in her best interest if more information regarding the good’s value can 
be gained by waiting. Therefore, in order to commit to the purchase now and forgo future 
learning opportunities, the agent must be compensated by being offered a lower price 
than would have been acceptable were future learning not an option. The authors refer to 
this compensation as the commitment cost.  
Zhao and Kling’s theory predicts that the cost of commitment increases as agents (i) 
are more uncertain about a good’s value, (ii) expect that more information about a good 
will be available in the future, (iii) are more patient in consuming a good, (iv) expect to 
encounter more difficulty in reversing a transaction, and (v) have less freedom in 
choosing when to make decisions. 
 
Commitment Cost: A Formal Model 
To better see how commitment cost might affect WTP, I develop a mathematical 
model that is an extension of the one presented by Zhao and Kling (2000). I begin with a 
simple, two-period, time-separable utility function: 
 1 2( , ) ( , ) ( , )U m G u m G u m Gb= + , (1) 
where m represents per-period income, G represents environmental quality, and b is the 
discount factor. The status quo level of environmental quality is denoted by G0. A higher 
level of environmental quality G can be purchased in the current period, the future period, 
or not at all. If G is purchased in the current period, it can also be enjoyed in the future at 
no additional cost. For example, G might be achieved through a package of government-
sponsored mitigation efforts such as establishing buffer strips and retiring agricultural 
land around a lake in order to reduce nutrient inflow. In this study, the agent’s decision to 
“purchase” improved environmental quality will be thought of as her voting yes on a 
hypothetical referendum that would both implement the policies intended to improve 
environmental quality and impose a $p tax on area households.  
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In this model, I assume that the agent is uncertain about the value of G. This could be 
due to uncertainty either regarding the degree to which water quality would be improved 
if the proposed policies were implemented or regarding how much benefit the agent 
actually would derive from those improvements. Formally speaking, the agent’s beliefs 
regarding G are represented by the distribution function 0 ( )F G  and the corresponding 
density 0 ( )f G . A signal arriving in the second period provides more information about 
G. This signal is denoted by s SÎ Ì R , where S is the set of all possible signals and R  is 
the real number line. In the context of the Clear Lake study, the signal could be thought 
of as more accurate information regarding the degree of water quality improvement 
brought about by proposed mitigation efforts. Qualified by the true value of G, the 
possible signals are described by the conditional density function | ( )s Gh s . The 
unconditional density function for s can then be defined as | 0( ) ( ) ( )s Gh s h dF= × ×ò . 
Observing s, the agent updates her beliefs about G according to Bayes’s rule: 
| | 0( ) ( ) / ( )G s s Gf h f h= × × × . 
Let EU1 denote the agent’s expected utility if she purchases G in the current period. 
Since the new level of environmental quality can be enjoyed now and in the future, I 
write this as 
 ( ) ( )( )1 , ,GEU E u m p G u m Gb= - + , (2) 
where p is the price of implementing the new environmental policy, and EG(·) represents 
expectation over G. Let ( , )V p s  be the agent’s expected surplus from delaying the 
purchase until after observing s. That is,  
 ( )0 |( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( )G sV p s u m p G u m G dF G= - -ò . (3) 
If the agent waits until the future period to observe the signal, she will buy the good if 
and only if ( , ) 0V p s ³ . Let EU2 denote the agent’s expected utility if she delays the 
purchasing decision. This can be represented as  
 ( ) ( )( ) ( )2 0 1 1 2 0, Pr( ) , | Pr( ) , ,P G P PEU u m G S E u m p G s S S u m Gb b= + - Î +  (4) 
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where { }1( ) | ( , ) 0PS p s S V p s= Î ³  and SP2(p) is the compliment of SP1(p). In other 
words, SP1(p) is the set of all signals that will induce the agent to purchase G in the 
second period, while SP2(p) is the set of signals that will lead the agent to opt for the 
status quo level of environmental quality G0.  
Given a functional form for U(·), it is possible to calculate a closed-form expression 
for the commitment cost CC. I assume that 
 ( ) (1 )
m G
u
r r
a a
r r
× = + - . (5) 
This is a monotonic transformation of the familiar constant elasticity of substitution 
(CES) utility function, where [0,1]a Î  is the weight the agent puts on income, and 1r £  
relates to the agent’s elasticity of substitution ( 1 (1 )s r= - ). One of the benefits of the 
CES utility function is that the linear, Cobb-Douglass, and Leontief utility functions are 
all special cases corresponding to 1r = , 0, and -¥ , respectively. 
Taking into account uncertainty, irreversibility, and the opportunity for learning, the 
agent’s decision in the current period is whether to buy now or to delay the decision until 
next period when more information will be available. In this dynamic framework, the 
rational agent’s maximum willingness to pay, Rwtp , is the critical price, Rp , that leaves 
her indifferent between committing to G in the current period and delaying her decision 
until the future. Recalling that EU1 is the agent’s expected utility from buying today, the 
equation can be written as 
 1
1 1
( ) ( ) ( ) .G GEU m p E G m E G
r r r ra a a ab
r r r r
æ ö- -
= - + + +ç ÷
è ø
 (6) 
Similarly, EU2 can be written as 
 
2 0
1 1 2 0
1
1 1
Pr( ) ( ) ( | ) Pr( ) ,P G P P
EU m G
S m p E G s S S m G
r r
r r r r
a a
r r
a a a a
b
r r r r
-
= +
é ùæ ö æ ö- -
+ - + Î + +ê úç ÷ ç ÷
è ø è øë û
 (7) 
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where SP1 and SP2 are as defined above, and  
 ( ) ( )| 01( , ) ( ) G sV p s m p m G dF Gr r r ra ar r
-
= - - + -ò . (8) 
Equating 1( )
REU p  and 2 ( )
REU p  yields 
 
( )
1
1
,
1 Pr( )
R
P
A
wtp p m m
S
r
r
b
æ ö
º = - -ç ÷ç ÷-è ø
 (9) 
where 
 ( ) ( )0 1 1 01 1(1 ) ( ) Pr( ) ( | ) .G P G PA E G G S E G s S Gr r r ra ab ba a
- -
= + - - Î -  (10) 
On the other hand, a naive agent who ignores the potential for learning sees her 
decision as being whether to buy in the current period or never to buy. While I assume 
the naive agent recognizes that the benefits from purchasing G in the current period can 
be enjoyed in the future period, I also assume that she does not realize that delaying her 
purchasing decision may allow her to avoid a “bad purchase” (i.e., a purchase that yields 
negative surplus). Thus, the naive agent’s willingness to pay Nwtp  is the critical price Np  
such that the she is indifferent between purchasing the environmental improvement in the 
current period and never purchasing it. Given the assumptions on ( )U × , I derive Np  by 
equating 1( )
NEU p  and 2 ( )
NEU p  as follows:  
 ( ) ( )( ) ( )1 0 2( ) , , (1 ) , ( )N N NGEU p E u m p G u m G u m G EU pb b= - + = + = , (11) 
0
1 1 1
( ) ( ) ( ) (1 ) ,N G Gm p E G m E G m G
r r r r r ra a a a a ab b
r r r r r r
æ ö æ ö- - -
- + + + = + +ç ÷ ç ÷
è ø è ø
 (12) 
 0
1 1 1
( ) (1 ) ( ) ( ) .N G Gm p m G E G E G
r r r r ra a ab b
a a r
æ ö- - -æ ö- = + + - - ç ÷ç ÷
è ø è ø
 (13) 
Rearranging, I derive 
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 ( )
1
0
1
(1 ) ( ) .N N Gwtp p m m E G G
rr r rab
a
-æ öº = - - + -ç ÷
è ø
 (14) 
In the absence of future learning, the rational agent’s problem reduces to that of the 
naive agent, and the price Np  leaves both indifferent between purchasing the new higher 
level of quality now and settling for the status quo level. However, offered the 
opportunity for learning, the rational agent’s willingness to pay falls to R Nwtp wtp£ . In 
this context, the commitment cost can be thought of as the amount by which the price of 
the environmental improvement must be reduced in both periods to make the rational 
agent indifferent between purchasing now and delaying the decision until more 
information becomes available. In other words, commitment cost is the difference 
between Nwtp  and wtpR. Thus, I can write CC as the following closed-form expression: 
 
( ) ( )
1 1
0
1
1
(1 ) ( ) ,
1 Pr( )
N
G
P
A
CC wtp wtp m m E G G
S
r rr r r rab
b a
æ ö -æ ö= - = - - - + -ç ÷ ç ÷ç ÷- è øè ø
(15) 
where A is defined as in equation (10), and CC is positive as long as 1Pr( ) 0PS >  and 
1( | )G PE G s S
r Î 0( )GE G G
r r> > .  
 
Design of the Contingent Valuation Survey Instrument 
To test for the effects of potential learning and uncertainty on WTP, I use a 
technique similar to that used by Mansfield (1999). Specifically, I estimate respondent i’s 
stated willingness to pay as 
 ,Ni i i iWTP wtp CC e= + +  (16) 
where Niwtp  is the naive agent’s willingness to pay as defined in equation (14), ie  is a 
mean-zero error term, and CCi captures respondent i’s commitment cost. For the purpose 
of my analysis, I model CCi as  
 ( )Delay Delay HiVar HiVari i iCC D Dg g= + , (17) 
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where DelayiD  is a dummy variable equal to 1 if respondent i can potentially delay her 
decision, and HiVariD  is a dummy variable equal to 1 if respondent i faces a high degree of 
uncertainty regarding water quality after the proposed improvements. Although simple, 
this formulation takes into account the two key relationships identified in the theory 
above: commitment cost is present only when there is potential for future learning, and 
commitment cost varies according to the degree of uncertainty the respondent faces. 
Following Cameron (1988), iWTP  can be estimated from dichotomous choice data 
by noting that the probability that agent i votes yes (Yi = 1) on a referendum to improve 
environmental quality is 
 
( ) ( )
( )
Pr 1 Pr
Pr
Pr
1 Pr ,
i i i
N
i i i i
N
i i i
i
N
i i i
i
Y WTP T
wtp CC T
T wtp CC
T wtp CC
te
e
t
e
t
= = ³
= + + ³
æ ö- -
= ³ç ÷
è ø
æ ö- -
= - £ç ÷
è ø
 (18) 
where Ti is the policy price faced by respondent i and t  is the standard error of ie . 
Assuming ie  is drawn from the extreme value error distribution yields the following 
logistic expression for the probability of a yes response: 
 
1
Pr( 1) 1 exp
N
i i i
i
T wtp CC
Y
t
-
æ öæ ö- - -
= = +ç ÷ç ÷
è øè ø
. (19) 
The corresponding log likelihood function is 
 
ln ln 1 exp
(1 ) ln 1 exp  .
N
i i i
i
i
N N
i i i i i i
i
i
T wtp CC
L Y
T wtp CC T wtp CC
Y
t
t t
æ öæ ö- - -
= - +ç ÷ç ÷
è øè ø
é ùæ öæ ö æ ö- - - - - -
+ - - +ê úç ÷ç ÷ ç ÷
ê úè ø è øè øë û
å
å
 (20) 
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After using maximum likelihood estimation to fit parameters to this model, an estimate of 
respondent i’s willingness to pay µ iWTP  can be calculated as follows: 
 µ
¶
.
N
ii
i
wt p CC
WTP
t
+
=
-
$
$  (21) 
Finally, mean WTP can be estimated by taking the average of the µ iWTP  estimates. 
A contingent valuation model (CVM) survey instrument was designed to value 
various plans for improving the water quality at Clear Lake in northern Iowa. The survey 
first described the lake’s current condition in terms of water clarity, color, odor, fish 
catch, and the frequency of algae blooms and beach closings. Next, the survey described 
three future water quality scenarios corresponding to different degrees of environmental 
mitigation. Each of these scenarios was followed by a referendum-format CVM question 
designed to elicit respondents’ willingness to pay in order to achieve the conditions 
described. Hoehn and Randall (1987) show that the referendum mechanism is demand 
revealing so long as respondent i believes that all respondents face the same policy price, 
and that the referendum will pass if the majority votes in favor of the proposed project. 
Strictly speaking, truth telling is a voter’s weakly dominant strategy when voting is 
costless. A copy of the survey instrument is included in Appendix A. 
Prior to the actual mailing of the survey, the instrument was presented to a focus 
group of local residents to test its clarity and realism. This was followed by a mailed 
pretest. In its final form, the survey was sent to a random sample of 900 households in the 
cities of Clear Lake and Ventura, Iowa, both of which are located on Clear Lake. Survey 
Sampling, Inc., a Connecticut-based market research firm, drew the sample from the 
white pages of the telephone directory. Of these 900 surveys, 132 were eventually 
returned as undeliverable. Following the procedure laid out by Dillman (1978), a follow-
up postcard and survey were sent to those households that did not respond to the initial 
mailing. The eventual response rate among surveys successfully delivered was about 70 
percent.  
A summary of the respondents’ socioeconomic characteristics can be found in Table 
1. Compared to the most recent county-level census data, survey respondents, on average, 
were significantly more likely to be older, to be college-educated, to be male, to be  
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TABLE 1. Characteristics of survey respondents 
Variable Definition Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
County 
Average 
Income Total household 
income 
56,000 44,000 51,000 
Education 1 if college graduate 0.36 0.48 0.16 
Age The respondent’s age 55 15 47 
Gender 1 if male 0.65 0.48 0.47 
Family size Includes adults and 
children 
2.6 1.3 2.3 
Homeowner 1 if own home 0.91 0.29 0.72 
Year-round 
resident 
1 if year-round 
resident 
0.95 0.22 – 
 
homeowners, and to live in a larger household. Respondents’ average income was not 
significantly different from the county average. While no county-level data was available 
for year-round residency, it is likely that seasonal residents were underrepresented in the 
sample because many seasonal residents do not receive mail at their Clear Lake 
addresses. 
Six versions of the survey were sent out, each differing in terms of the degree of 
uncertainty surrounding water quality after the proposed improvement, and in terms of 
the potential for future learning. Survey version 1 presented respondents with a low 
degree of variance (e.g., water clarity between 6 and 8 feet after improvements) and no 
potential for future learning. The color photo and diagram used to depict this low level of 
uncertainty can be found in Appendix B. The absence of future learning potential was 
written into the CVM question as follows: 
 
Further, suppose this survey represents the State’s only chance to gather information 
about what kind of value people put on Clear Lake. Please respond as if this will be your 
final opportunity to vote on the issue, and that if the following referendum fails to pass, 
there will be no future programs to improve water quality at Clear Lake. 
Would you vote “yes” on a referendum that would adopt the proposed program but 
cost you $x (payable in five $x/5 installments over a five-year period)?  
 
Version 2 again presented respondents with low variance but allowed for potential future 
learning by offering respondents a second chance to vote on the referendum: 
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Further, suppose that if the referendum passes, the improvements would proceed 
immediately. However, if the referendum fails, any plans to improve the lake would be 
delayed for one year while further research takes place into the causes of lake pollution 
as well as alternative clean-up approaches. After this delay, any new information from 
studying the lake will be made available and you will then get a final chance to vote on 
the same referendum. 
Would you vote “yes” on a referendum that would adopt the proposed program but 
cost you $x (payable in five $x/5 installments over a five-year period)?  
 
Version 3 differed from version 2 only in that respondents were told that, should the 
initial referendum fail, five years would pass before they would be given a second chance 
to vote. Versions  4, 5, and 6 were analogous to versions 1, 2, and 3 except that 
respondents faced a higher degree of uncertainty in terms of the expected water quality 
(e.g., water clarity between 2 and 12 feet after the proposed improvements). The color 
diagram used to depict this higher level of uncertainty appears in Appendix C. The results 
show no significant difference between the responses of those who were offered the one-
year delay and those who were offered five. This suggests that any perceived gains from 
delaying the decision an additional four years were offset by the associated delay of 
improvements in water quality. Therefore, for the sake of simplicity, I combined the 
results from versions 2 and 3, and from versions 5 and 6.  
Commitment cost theory predicts that respondents would be willing to pay less in the 
current period (i.e., would be less likely to vote yes) for proposed improvements when 
given the opportunity to delay their decision until more information is available. 
Likewise, the theory predicts that, given the potential for learning, respondents would be 
willing to pay less in the current period when faced with higher variance. Put in terms of 
testable hypotheses, commitment cost theory predicts the following: 
H1: NoDelay DelayWTP WTP>  
H2: Delay DelayLoVar HiVarWTP WTP>  
H3: NoDelay DelayLoVar LoVarWTP WTP>  
H4: NoDelay DelayHiVar HiVarWTP WTP>  
The Effect of Future Availability of Information on Willingness to Pay / 13 
The superscripts in these hypothesis tests refer to whether survey respondents had any 
chance to delay their decision until more information became available. Specifically, 
NoDelayWTP  represents willingness to pay in the absence of the possibility of a future 
referendum, while DelayWTP  represents willingness to pay given that a second referendum 
would be held should the first fail. The subscripts refer to the degree of variance 
respondents faced. Notations DelayLoVarWTP  and 
Delay
HiVarWTP  represent willingness to pay given 
the potential for learning when faced with low and high variance, respectively.  
 
Results of the Contingent Valuation Model Analysis 
After deleting the responses of residents who did not answer the CVM question, did 
not provide relevant socioeconomic information, or whose surveys were spoiled, 357 
responses remained.1 Of these, 43 respondents answered a follow-up question in such a 
way as to indicate that they did not understand the CVM question or considered it 
unrealistic. These respondents may not have given serious consideration to the policy 
price, in which case their responses to the CVM question would contain little or no 
information regarding their valuation of the resource. Therefore, I treat such answers as 
protest responses and exclude them from the following analysis. 
Table 2 presents the results of the logistic regression described in the previous 
section. The results in the second column are from a regression in which all agents are 
assumed to have identical preferences. In order to confine a  to the unit interval, I set 
/(1 )x xe ea = +  and estimated x. Likewise, to restrict r  to the ( ,1]-¥  interval, I set 
1yer = - +  and estimated y. The results in the third column are from a regression 
allowing a  and r  to vary with income, ignoring the interval restriction in the case of a . 
More specifically, I estimate ia  as Intercept Income ima a+  and ir  as 
exp( ) 1Intercept Income imr r- + + .
2 
As shown in Table 2, both estimates of t  are negative and highly significant, 
indicating the demand curve for improved environmental quality is downward sloping. 
The estimate for a  reported in the second column is very close to one, indicating  
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TABLE 2. Regression results with protest responses deleted 
Variable 
Homogeneous  
Preferences 
Heterogeneous 
 Preferences 
t -0.00116** (-3.59)a -0.000927** (-2.59) 
a 0.988** (86.3) - 
aIntercept - 1.02** (146) 
aIncome - -0.00112** (-3.96) 
r 0.249 (1.01) - 
rIntercept - 0.416 (1.35) 
rIncome - -0.0266** (-2.91) 
gDelay -0.823** (-2.85) -0.732** (-2.45) 
gHiVar 0.530 (1.60) 0.463 (1.38) 
Percent correct 63 percent 66 percent 
a Asymptotic t ratios are in parentheses. 
* Significant at the 0.05 level. 
** Significant at the 0.01 level. 
 
respondents put much greater weight on income than on water quality.3 In the case where 
a  is allowed to vary across individuals, the coefficient Incomea  is negative and highly 
significant, indicating that respondents put more weight on environmental quality as their 
income increases. The point estimate 0.961a =  is simply the average of the ia  estimates. 
I calculated the 95 percent confidence interval around this estimate (0.934, 0.989) using a 
bootstrapping technique. One thousand realizations of Intercepta  and Incomea  were drawn 
from a multivariate normal distribution with a variance-covariance matrix and mean 
vector taken from the maximum likelihood estimation whose results are presented in 
Table 2. For each of these draws, I calculated an aˆ  that was the average over all 
respondents. The reported confidence interval is generated by ranking these 1,000 aˆ  
estimates and deleting the highest and lowest 25. 
The estimates of r  reported in the second column of Table 2 lie on the interior of 
the ( ,1]-¥  range and are significantly different from one, indicating that while there is 
some degree of substitutability between money and environmental quality, the two are 
not perfect substitutes. The same is true for point estimate 0.501r =  and the associated 
95 percent confidence interval (0.203, 0.656) that follow from the Interceptr  and Incomer  
estimates reported in the third column. As described for a, this confidence interval was 
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calculated by bootstrapping. The estimate for rIncome is negative and highly significant. 
Considered in conjunction with the restriction exp( ) 1Intercept Income imr r r= - + + , this 
indicates that respondents with higher income are more willing to substitute money for 
environmental quality.  
Both estimates of Delayg  are negative and highly significant. This suggests that 
offering survey respondents the opportunity to delay their decision until more 
information becomes available reduces WTP in the current period. This is in keeping 
with the predictions of commitment cost theory.  
Estimates of HiVarg  are not significantly different from zero in either of the reported 
regressions, failing to support Zhao and Kling’s prediction that commitment cost will be 
greater for individuals facing greater uncertainty. This may seem surprising given that 
uncertainty is a necessary condition for the existence of commitment cost. However, the 
survey was only able to vary uncertainty surrounding the expected degree of water 
quality improvements. The survey could not address uncertainty regarding the value 
respondents might eventually derive from the improvements once they have been 
realized. Therefore, finding that HiVarg  is not significantly different from zero may be 
interpreted as meaning that the latter type of uncertainty is the one driving commitment 
cost. 
For both regressions, a chi-squared test rejects the null hypothesis that the g 
coefficients jointly equal zero at the 0.05 level (c2 = 8.80 [2] and c2 = 8.69 [2], 
respectively). 
Table 3 shows estimates of mean WTP, conditional on both the opportunity for 
learning and the level of uncertainty. Again, for the sake of comparison, I include the 
results of both regressions. The confidence intervals were calculated using a 
bootstrapping technique similar to that used for a  and r .  
Table 4 presents the hypothesis tests suggested in the previous section. A positive 
number in the second and third columns indicates that the relative magnitude of the WTP 
estimates was qualitatively in line with the predictions of the commitment cost model. 
Based on the results of H1, I am able to reject the null hypotheses of no difference at the 
0.05 significance level for both regressions. This suggests that, overall, WTP in the  
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TABLE 3. Willingness-to-pay estimates  
Version 
Homogeneous 
Preferences 
Heterogeneous 
Preferences 
All versions $852 
(750, 2582)a 
$868 
(657, 2083) 
No delay 
 
1152 
(938, 3525) 
1144 
(761, 3113) 
Potential delay 
 
665 
(489, 2386) 
694 
(380, 2143) 
Low variance 
 
776 
(651, 2595) 
788 
(545, 1956) 
High variance 
 
977 
(777, 2833) 
992 
(653, 2021) 
Low variance, no delay 1171 
(943, 2835) 
1153 
(800, 2619) 
Low variance, delay 512 
(319, 2308) 
543 
(271, 1273) 
High variance, no delay 1128 
(919, 2758) 
1132 
(793, 2792) 
High variance, delay 877 
(564, 2709) 
898 
(443, 2050) 
a 95 percent confidence intervals are in parentheses. 
 
 
TABLE 4. Hypothesis tests 
Alternative Hypothesisa 
Difference in WTP 
Homogeneous  
Parameters 
Difference in WTP 
Heterogeneous 
Preferences 
H1: WTPNoDelay > WTPDelay  $487* (2.01)b $450* (1.74) 
H2: Delay DelayLoVar HiVarWTP WTP>   -365 (-1.53) -355 (-1.40) 
H3: NoDelay DelayLoVar LoVarWTP WTP>  659** (2.90) 610** (2.43) 
H4: NoDelay DelayHiVar HiVarWTP WTP>  251 (0.933) 234 (0.920) 
a The null hypothesis is that there is no difference between the two WTP measures. 
b Estimated standard errors are in parentheses. 
* Significant at the 0.05 level using a one-sided t test. 
** Significant at the 0.01 level using a one-sided t test. 
 
current period is significantly reduced when survey respondents are offered the 
opportunity to delay their purchasing decision until more information becomes available. 
This is as predicted by the commitment cost model. Based on the results of H3, I can 
reject the null at the 0.01 level. The interpretation here is similar to that from H1. In tests 
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H2 and H4 I cannot reject the null hypothesis at conventional levels of significance. This 
fails to support the prediction that that commitment cost is increasing in the degree of 
uncertainty facing respondents.  
 
Concluding Remarks 
In this paper, I test for the effects of potential future learning on WTP in the presence 
of uncertainty and irreversibility and whether those effects are consistent with Zhao and 
Kling’s theory of commitment cost. Using a survey instrument designed specifically to 
measure WTP given varying degrees of uncertainty and learning potential, I collected 
data from Clear Lake area residents regarding their valuation of a proposed project to 
improve water quality in Clear Lake. My findings show that respondents’ willingness to 
pay is indeed sensitive to the potential for future learning. This is consistent with Zhao 
and Kling’s theory of commitment cost and suggests that CVM practitioners must take 
care to accurately represent the potential for future learning or else risk-biased results. 
The effect of increased variance on WTP, however, was insignificant. Thus, while my 
results lend support to the theory of commitment cost in the broadest sense, they do not 
confirm the theory’s prediction that commitment cost increases with uncertainty.  
These results have important implications for the design of stated preference surveys. 
If uncertainty, irreversibility, and the potential for learning are inherent to the policy 
under consideration, then commitment cost is relevant to the eventual policy decision, 
and stated preference questions should be written to reflect this. My analysis suggests that 
it is especially important for the survey instrument to accurately convey the potential for 
learning, as this determines whether the respondents’ problem is static or dynamic.  
Suppose, for example, that policymakers are considering converting an empty 
commercial lot into a public park. Assume that money spent on the project cannot be 
recouped, that there is some degree of uncertainty regarding the benefit local residents 
will derive from the park if it is built, and that the project can be reasonably delayed until 
some future date when residents may have a better estimate of the park’s value. In this 
situation, commitment cost is policy relevant. In order to avoid overestimating WTP, a 
CVM instrument intended to estimate the value of the proposed project must be written 
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so that it captures commitment cost. In particular, the instrument should explicitly note 
the potential for delay and subsequent learning.  
On the other hand, suppose the issue under consideration is whether to save a pristine 
wilderness area from imminent and irreversible commercial development. In this case, 
there is no potential for delaying the decision and thus no potential for future learning. 
Here, commitment cost is not policy relevant. Instead, the appropriate measure of welfare 
change is simply equivalent variation. A study that does not convey the immediacy of the 
decision may mistakenly capture commitment cost as part of its estimate of WTP, thus 
biasing the estimate downward. 
An interesting area for future research would be to determine whether WTP 
estimates elicited by a “typical” CVM instrument that makes no reference to the potential 
for delay and future learning elicits results more similar to what I have referred to in this 
paper as WTPNoDelay or WTPDelay. A survey similar to the one described in this paper was 
sent to Clear Lake visitors. The primary difference between these two surveys was that 
the version sent to visitors made no reference to future learning potential. Comparing the 
results elicited from area residents with those elicited from visitors suggests that the 
typical CVM survey format is associated with WTP estimates more similar to NoDelayWTP . 
However, it is difficult to make any definitive conclusions based on the results from two 
very different samples.
  
Endnotes 
1. A typographical error in one of the survey versions left the CVM question ambiguous. While the error 
was corrected in the second mailing, 61 surveys were still thrown out. 
2. A third regression was performed allowing a , r , Delayg  and HiVarg  to vary with income. The results 
are not reported here since the null hypothesis 0Delay HiVarIncome Incomeg g= =  could not be rejected at conventional 
significance levels ( 2c = 0.89 [2]). 
3. Unfortunately, since a  and b  only appear together in the expression for wtpN, they cannot be 
estimated separately. The estimate of a  reported in Table 2 corresponds to 0.9b = . Appendix D 
contains estimates of a  corresponding to other values of b . All other parameters in the model are 
unaffected by the choice of b . 
 Appendix A: The Clear Lake Survey 
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Appendix B: Low-Variance Graphic 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Water clarity objects distinguishable 6 to 8 feet 
under water 
Algae blooms 3 to 4 per year 
Water color green to blue 
Water odor occasional mild 
Bacteria infrequent swim advisories 
Fish high diversity 
Plan C 
general water color
visible bottom
  
Appendix C: High-Variance Graphic 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Water clarity objects distinguishable 2 to 12 feet 
under water 
Algae blooms 0 to 8 per year 
Water color greenish brown to blue 
Water odor occasional mild to no odor 
Bacteria infrequent swim advisories to no 
advisories 
Fish low to high diversity 
Plan C 
general water color 
visible bottom 
Greatest possible  
affect of Plan C 
Least possible  
affect of Plan C 
  
Appendix D: The Relationship between b and a 
b Value Estimate of a 
Homogeneous Parameters 
Estimate of a 
Heterogeneous Parameters 
1.0 0.989 0.963 
0.9 0.988 0.961 
0.8 0.988 0.960 
0.7 0.987 0.957 
0.6 0.986 0.955 
0.5 0.985 0.953 
0.4 0.984 0.950 
0.3 0.983 0.947 
0.2 0.982 0.944 
0.1 0.980 0.940 
0.0 0.978 0.936 
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